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Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatising 
their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In an international mixed oligopoly, we analyse the interaction between privatisation and FDI. 
We show that privatisation increases the incentive for FDI, which in turn, increases the incentive for 
privatisation compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatisation depends on the 
cost difference between the public and the foreign firms, and on the foreign firm’s mode of entry. We 
show that our results are robust with respect to the incentive contracts between the owners and the 
managers. The incentive for FDI and is higher under the incentive contract than under the no incentive 
contract, and the optimal degree of privatisation is almost always higher under the incentive contract 
than under the no incentive contract.  
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Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatising 
their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). We analyse the interaction between privatisation and FDI under an international mixed oligopoly 
framework. The host country government is considering to partially privatise its public firm, and a private 
firm in the home country is deciding to serve the host country by undertaking FDI or exporting. We show 
that privatisation increases the incentive for FDI and the possibility of FDI increases the incentive for 
privatisation compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatisation depends on the cost 
difference between the public and the foreign firms, and on the foreign firm’s mode of entry. We also show 
that our results are robust with respect to the incentive contracts between the owners and the managers. 
The incentive for FDI is higher under the incentive contract than under the no incentive contract, and the 
optimal degree of privatisation is almost always higher under the incentive contract than under the no 
incentive contract.  
 1. Introduction 
Two important developments in many developing and transition economies are the 
privatisation of their state-owned enterprises across several sectors and the significant 
inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI). Is there any relationship between 
privatisation and FDI? We address this question in this paper. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper that considers the relationship between 
the incentives for privatisation and FDI. 
In a mixed Cournot oligopoly, we show that privatisation of a public firm in 
the host country increases foreign firm’s incentive for FDI. And with the possibility of 
FDI, the government will have higher incentive for privatisation compared to the 
situation of no FDI. We find that partial privatisation is the optimal strategy of the 
host country. In other words, neither complete privatisation nor complete 
nationalisation maximises the host country welfare in presence of foreign 
competition. This result is in line with the evidences suggested by Maw (2002), which 
shows that partial privatisation of the public firms are mostly observed in transition 
countries while their economies are increasingly open to foreign competitions.  
We extend our basic analysis to incorporate the implications of incentive 
contracts where the owners hire managers to decide on the output level based on the 
given contracts which are the combination of profit and revenue. As pointed out by 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) that strategic benefit in the oligopolistic product markets 
may induce the owners of the firms to distort their managers’ objectives away from 
strict profit maximisation. In this present paper, we show that the positive relationship 
between privatisation and FDI, and partial privatisation as the optimal choice of the 
host country remain even under the incentives scheme. However, the incentive for 
FDI is higher under the incentive contracts than under no incentive contract, and the optimal degree of privatisation is almost always higher under the incentive contracts 
than under the no incentive contract.
1
Our results are in line with the empirical evidences. Using annual data for 
1990-99 for eight Asian and nine Latin American and Caribbean countries, Gani 
(2005) provides strong evidence that privatisation is positively related to FDI. In an 
earlier study on Latin America, Baer (1994) notes that the presence of foreign capital 
has increased as the presence of state has declined. It is also mentioned in UNCTAD 
(2002) that along with a combination of several reform measures such as improved 
investment climate, openness to trade and FDI, macroeconomic stability, etc., 
privatisation has increased FDI inflow over the 1990s. Focusing on the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs), Marlevede and Schoors (2005) show the effect 
of direct privatisation sale, which is more likely to be invested by the foreign 
investors, and non-direct privatisation sale (i.e., vouchers and insider sale), which is 
less likely to be invested by the foreign investors, on FDI. They show that 
privatisation history positively affects FDI irrespective of direct or non-direct 
privatisation, though direct privatisation has an immediate positive effect on FDI.  
It has been found that, during 2000-2003, China accounted for almost 90 per 
cent of the privatisation proceeds
2 in East Asia and the Pacific and it is, at the same 
                                                 
1 Like most of the literature on privatisation, we consider the situation where privatisation implies the 
sale of shares of the public firm to the domestic private sector, and show the effects of privatisation on 
FDI. The overviews of privatisation literature are provided in Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Schmidt 
and Schnitzer (1997). There is a recent literature that considers the situation where foreign investors 
take over a part or whole of the public firms in the host countries, which is often called “foreign 
privatisation” (see, e.g., Kalotay and Hunya, 2000, Norbäck and Persson, 2004 and 2005, Merlevede 
and Schoors, 2005). However, as mentioned in Norbäck and Persson (2005), often some countries 
restrict foreign individuals and firms to acquire domestic firms, or apply special restrictions to foreign 
firms in certain industries, as is the case in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, for example. Though 
the practice of the countries in this respect changes over time, the government policies still favour 
green-field investment (UNCTAD, 2000). Hence, our analysis is more relevant for the economies 
where the domestic private sectors hold shares of the public firms.  
 
2 Privatisation proceeds are defined to include all monetary receipts to the government resulting from 
partial and complete divestitures (via asset sales or sale of shares), concessions, leases, and other 
arrangements. The data do not cover management contracts, new green field investments, investments 
  1time, the biggest FDI recipient in the region. India also shares a similar story. Other 
regions, such as Latin America and Europe and Central Asia, also recorded the same 
trend of FDI and privatisation proceeds.
3 Figure 1 shows the relationship between 
privatisation and FDI in the developing countries. In general, the figure shows similar 
trends for both FDI and privatisation proceeds of the developing countries, thus 
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Figure 1: Total FDI and privatisation proceeds from all developing countries 
  Source: Kikeri and Kolo (2005), World Bank Development Data Platform and FDI database 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes 
the related literature and indicates the present paper’s contribution to the literature on 
privatisation. Section 3 explains the setting of the basic model. The effects of 
privatisation on FDI incentive and welfare are demonstrated in Section 4. Section 5 
extends the basic model by considering the implications of the incentive contracts. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
committed by new private operators as part of concession agreements, and ‘voucher’ privatisations 
(Kikeri and Kolo, 2005).  
3 Kikeri and Kolo (2005) provide full details on privatisation in developing countries. 
4 It is important to note that this figure represents the effect of privatisation and FDI at an aggregate 
level, and therefore, it is not showing explicitly whether the sectors or the developing countries where 
privatisation has taken place are also the sectors or the developing countries experiencing higher FDI.  
  22. Related literature 
The studies related to privatisation are generally demonstrated in a mixed oligopoly 
framework. A mixed oligopoly market is characterised by a market that has a small 
number of firms and the objective function of at least one firm is different from the 
others. Specifically, it is the market that comprises of both public and private firms in 
which the public firm maximises welfare, whereas the firm owned by the private 
agent aims to maximise profit.
5 Moreover, the literature on privatisation analysis has, 
for the most part, considered the case of a closed economy which consists of a number 
of producers and consumers that are in the same country.  
Because of the growing evidences on privatisation, a fair attention has already 
paid to show the effects of privatisation on social welfare, yet the conclusion is 
inconclusive. Furthermore, while literatures on privatisation and FDI are growing in 
numbers, to the best of our knowledge, there seems to exist no theoretical study 
investigating the relationship between privatisation and FDI. This present paper 
attempts to create a bridge between the literatures on privatisation and FDI.
 6
The seminal works on privatisation by Harris and Wiens (1980), Beato and 
Mas-Colell (1984) and Cremer et al. (1989) are in favour of full nationalisation of the 
public firm. The papers show how a public firm can be used as an effective policy 
instrument to reduce inefficiency created in imperfect competitive markets. The 
public firm, who maximises social welfare, acts as a disciplining device and helps to 
obtain the first best allocation of outputs. 
Recent work by Barros (1995) introduces the incentive contracts in a 
principal-agent framework where each firm hires manager to control its production 
                                                 
5 In case of a partially nationalised firm, the firm puts positive weights on both welfare and profits. De 
Fraja and Delbono (1989) provide definition of mixed oligopoly in more details.  
6 Pal and White (1998) provide an excellent survey on privatisation in mixed oligopoly.  
  3output. The analysis suggests that privatisation leads to a fall in welfare as there is a 
fall in consumer surplus when the public firm maximises profit instead of social 
welfare. Hence, the country is better off with a state-owned firm.  
In contrast, using a model with adverse selection, Rees (1988) suggests that 
inefficiencies arise with the performance of public enterprise, thus questioning the 
rationale for having public firms. The works on privatisation get further momentum 
with De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which determine the welfare effects of 
privatisation in a mixed oligopoly, where a welfare maximising state-owned firm 
competes with   profit maximising private firms. They show that privatisation may 
increase welfare if the marginal costs of production are rising.  
n
Anderson et al. (1997) show a source of welfare loss due to a public firm when 
there is a domestic free entry. The paper shows that while privatisation of the public 
firm may produce negative effect in the short run; it can be beneficial in the long run 
as privatisation induces entry of the domestic firms provided that consumers have a 
taste for product variety and the public firm was making loss prior privatisation. In a 
model which comprises of one public firm competing with private firms that offer 
differentiated products, the public firm acts as an entry deterrent by keeping the price 
low, so that the private competitors have to lower their mark-ups. Privatisation would 
lead to higher product prices and a lower welfare in the short run. In the long run, a 
reduction in the role of the public firm encourages the entry of domestic firms, 
increasing product varieties to the market.  
While earlier works compare complete privatisation with complete 
nationalisation, Fershtman (1990) and Matsumura (1998) have put forward 
justifications for partial privatisation. In a mixed duopoly, Fershtman (1990) shows 
that the market equilibrium can be such that the partially privatised firm realises 
  4higher profit than its private, profit-maximising, competitor. Assuming that the two 
firms are equal in cost, the partial nationalisation serves as a credible commitment to 
increase output beyond the profit maximising level. Such degree of nationalisation 
shifts the firm’s reaction function rightward, leading to a higher market share of the 
public firm while reducing the private firm’s share. The paper also allows for the 
asymmetry in the firms’ cost where the public firm is relatively cost inefficient than 
the private firm. In such a situation, the welfare effect of nationalisation depends on 
the relative gain in consumer surplus and the loss from allocative efficiency. If the 
public firm is more cost inefficient than its private competitor, nationalisation may 
reduce welfare.  
Matsumura (1998) investigate the extent to which the government should 
control the public firm. More specifically, the paper determines the optimal 
shareholding by the government in a privatised public firm. In a mixed duopoly where 
products are perfect substitutes, the paper shows that full nationalisation is welfare 
reducing unless the public firm is a monopoly in the product market. However, 
whether partial or complete privatisation is optimal depends on the cost difference 
between the public and private firms. If the firms are equal in cost or the public firm is 
strictly more cost efficient than the private firm, full privatisation is never the optimal 
policy. However, irrespective to the firms’ cost structure, the public firm should be (at 
least partially) privatised. If the cost of the public firm is sufficiently higher than that 
of the private firm, complete privatisation is the optimal strategy.  
A common feature of these papers is to consider privatisation in a closed 
economy. Though these studies have their own merits, they are not appropriate for 
economies where significant amount of competition is due to the presence of foreign 
firms. The present paper is more close to the recently growing literature on 
  5privatisation in an open economy where a great deal of competition is due to foreign 
competition. However, most of these papers are mainly concentrated on privatisation 
and strategic trade policies issue
7.  
Pal and White (1998) investigate privatisation effect in presence of strategic 
trade policies such as domestic production subsidies and import tariffs. The paper 
indicates that even though the public firm is as efficient as the private firm, 
privatisation may still improve welfare. If the production subsidy is used as the policy 
instrument, welfare improves with privatisation. Alternatively, if tariffs are used, 
welfare can increase provided there are at least two firms in the market and the 
marginal cost curve for production is not very flat.  
Ohori (2004) shows the effects of privatisation on tariff and environmental 
taxes and shows that privatisation is not beneficial for social welfare. Thereafter, 
Ohori (2006) considers strategic government policies in an economy where two 
public firms compete in a third country through exports. The paper shows that partial 
privatisation of the state-owned enterprises is the optimal strategy of the respective 
countries.  
Unlike the above-mentioned papers, Fjell and Heywood (2002) and Isibashi et 
al. (2005) are the only few papers which consider privatisation in an open economy 
without other strategic government policies.  
Fjell and Heywood (2002) consider privatisation effects when a public firm 
behaves like a Stackelberg leader where there are m domestic private firms and n 
foreign private firms acting as Cournot followers. Assuming that the public firm 
retains its Stackelberg leader even after privatisation, the paper shows that the welfare 
                                                 
7 There are other papers investigate the issue of privatisation in this type of framework. However, we 
do not attempt to review them here. They are Fujiwara (2006), Chang (2005), and Chao and Yu (2006).  
  6effects on firms’ outputs, profits and welfare depend upon the relative number of 
domestic and foreign firms. 
Isibashi et al. (2005) extend Anderson et al. (1997) to the case with foreign 
competitors, and show that privatisation is more likely to increase welfare in the long 
run when the competitors of the public firm are foreign than when they are domestic. 
However, neither Fjell and Heywood (2002) nor Isibashi et al. (2005) consider the 
optimal degree of privatisation. 
Though, there are some studies looking at privatisation in open economies, a 
common feature of these studies is to ignore FDI by the foreign firms. To the best of 
our knowledge, there is only another paper by Norbäck and Persson (2005) that 
considers both privatisation and FDI. However, our focus is completely different from 
theirs by at least two important points. Firstly, we show how the degree of 
privatisation affects and is also affected by FDI, whereas they show that while selling 
assets of a state-owned firm whether it is welfare improving to allow a foreign firm to 
acquire this asset when the foreign firm has the option to enter the market by 
exporting and FDI. So, unlike us, they do not consider the effects of privatisation on 
FDI and vice versa. Instead, they determine whether it is better to sell the asset of a 
state-owned firm to a foreign investor or to a domestic investor. Another important 
difference to note is that, in their analysis, the state-owned firm is not a competitor in 
the product market, whereas in our analysis, the foreign firm competes with the state-
owned firm.  
    The present paper is also related to the vast literature on FDI. While the 
existing literature on FDI has explained the reasons for doing FDI compared to other 
modes of foreign market entry such as exporting, technology licensing, etc., and also 
uncovered several issues related to FDI, those works have focused on profit 
  7maximising private firms, thus ignoring the issue of privatisation. Instead of 
reviewing the vast literature on FDI, we refer to Pack and Saggi (1997) and Saggi 
(2002) for recent surveys on FDI.  
 
3. The Model 
We consider a two-country model, which consists of a home country and a host 
country, and assume that there is one firm in each country. The firms produce a 
homogenous product. The firm in the home country is called firm M M . Firm   would 
like to serve the demand in the host country market either by FDI or by exports. The 
firm in the host country is a public (or state-owned) firm, called firm  .  P
M P An important difference between firms   and   is about their objective 
functions. While the former firm maximises profit, the latter firm maximises a convex 
combination of profit and social welfare depending on the share distribution between 
the government and the private owners of the host country.
8 In the following analysis, 
we will assume that, at the beginning, firm P  is completely nationalised, which 
means that, to start with, the objective function of firm P  is to maximise the welfare 
of the host country.  
  We consider the following cost structure for the firms. We assume that the 
constant marginal cost of firm P  is  . The constant marginal costs of firm  p c M  under 
export and FDI are respectively   and  , where  x f c c < X c f c . For simplicity, we 
normalise   to 0 . We assume that firm M f c  is more cost efficient than firm  , with 
the following relationship between the marginal costs: 
P
p X f c c c ≤ < = 0 . We assume 
that, under FDI, firm M  needs to incur a fixed cost  .  f
                                                 
8 We consider privatisation as the process of a change in the structure of the public firm. Privatisation 
reflects the transfer of the public firm’s ownership from the government to the private owners. 
  8We further assume that the inverse market demand function in the host 
country is   where the notations have the usual meanings, and   where 
. 
Q a p − = i c a >
p f x i , , =
In the next section, we consider the following game. At stage 1, the host 
country government decides on the level of privatisation, i.e., the fraction of 
shareholdings of firm   that can be held by the private owners of the host country. At 
stage 2, firm 
P
M  decides whether to undertake export or FDI. At stage 3, the firms 
compete in the product market like Cournot duopolists. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
 
4. The effects of privatisation on the FDI incentive and social welfare 
4.1. Privatisation and FDI incentives 
The objective of firm M  is to maximise its profits. Therefore, firm M  maximises  
( ) K q c q q a m m p m
m − − − − = π                      (1) 
where  and  denote the outputs of firms  p q m q M  and   respectively. We have    and  m c P
K  equal to   and   respectively under export, while    and  x c 0 m c K  equal to 0  and   
respectively under FDI.  
f
P The objective function of firm   depends on the share distribution between 
the government and the private owners of the host country. Following the existing 
literature (e.g., Fershtman, 1990), we assume that firm P  maximises a convex 
combination of profit and social welfare, where the weights on profits and social 
welfare are given by the fractions of shareholdings by the private owner and the 
government of the host country. As a justification for this type of objective function 
of the public firm, Fershtman (1990) argues that the behaviour of a partly nationalised 
  9firm result from a conflict of interests between the directors representing the private 
owners’ interests and the directors representing the government’s interest. This 
conflict of interests is assumed to be resolved through a compromise. Consequently, 
the firm’s output choice is a compromise between the output that maximises profits 
and the output that maximises welfare. 
P So, the objective function of firm   is: 
() w Obj
p p α απ − + = 1                               (2) 
where α  indicates the level of privatisation, i.e., the fraction of shareholdings by the 
private owners. Note that complete nationalisation and complete privatisation are the 
special cases of equation (2). If firm   is completely privatised,  P α  becomes one, and 
if firm   is completely nationalised,  P α  becomes zero. Specifically, the higher the α , 
the lesser the government holds shares in the privatised firm and the firm moves more 
towards profit maximisation. Equation (2) can be expanded to: 
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2 p m c c a  and  . The total output is  . 
Substituting these equilibrium outputs into both firms’ objective functions yield the 
following: 
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p m m c c a                                    (5) 
  102
a Note that under complete privatisation,   must be less than  p c  to ensure a duopoly 
market structure. We assume that this condition holds throughout our analysis.  
It is worth pointing out that, if the degree of privatisation is not very high, the 
profit generated in the (partially) privatised firm is negative. Hence, it is important to 
discuss why the private sector is interested to buy the shares of the public firm. There 
are at least two ways to induce the shareholding in the public firm by the private 
sector. First, the government can induce the private investors to acquire shares of the 
public firm by offering them a lump sum payment, which can be generated by 
imposing lump sum tax on the consumers. Since this lump sum payment simply 
represents a redistribution of surplus between consumers and private producers, 
output equilibriums and degree of privatisation are not affected. In other words, if a 
properly chosen degree of privatisation maximises social welfare, while creating 
negative profit in the public firm, there is always the case for compensating the 
private sector investors through non-distortionary subsidy for inducing them to buy 
the shares of the public firm. Another way to induce the private sector investors in 
acquiring shares of the public firm is to impose a minimum profit requirement for the 
public firm. However, as evident from Saha and Sensarma (2003) this constraint on 
the profit of the public firm induces the government to privatise in a way that 
generates lower welfare compared to situation with no such constraint. Hence, the 
first procedure dominates the effect of the second one, and our analysis assumes that 
such a tax-subsidy mechanism mentioned in the first procedure can be introduced 
effectively to induce the private sector investors to buy the shares of the public firm.  
M Let us now consider the optimal production strategy of firm  . Given the 
level of privatisation, firm M  prefers to undertake FDI than export provided:  
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       (7) 
where  and   represent the profits of firm M from FDI and export 
respectively. Equation (7) suggests that firm M chooses to undertake FDI if and only 







f ) (α p f ) (α p f , where   represents 
the difference between the gross profits of firm M  under FDI and export. The higher 
) (α p f , the greater the gross profit difference between FDI and export and, therefore, 
the higher the incentive for FDI.  
Let us now see how the incentive for FDI changes with respect to the degree 
of privatisation, i.e., how  ) (α p f  changes with respect to α . We find that 
   (8)  ()
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X Ceteris paribus, we find that   becomes smaller as   rises, and this is shown in the 









































cp = Further, we get that   at  . Hence, this implies that,  0 > X  is always 
positive, i.e., the incentive for FDI increases with α  (or higher degree of 
privatisation).  
The following proposition follows from the above discussion. 
  12 
Proposition 1: As the degree of privatisation increases, the incentive for FDI 
increases.  
 
The above result can be explained as follows. If the host country government 
increases the degree of privatisation in firm P P , the objective of firm   moves from 
welfare maximisation towards profit maximisation. As a result, given the output of 
firm  M P , a higher degree of privatisation shifts the reaction function of firm   
inward, and in the new equilibrium, the output of firm M  increases, while the output 
of firm P M  decreases. Furthermore, the gain in market share by firm   increases with 
its lower marginal cost of production, which, in turn, implies that a higher degree of 
privatisation increases the outputs and profits of firm M  more under FDI than under 
export. Hence, the incentive for FDI increases with a higher degree of privatisation. 
) (α p f It is worth noting that the derivative of   with respect to   is positive, 
suggesting that a fall in   reduces 
x c
) (α p f x c . Assuming that   involves trade costs, 
this relationship between   and 
x c
) (α p f x c  implies that, ceteris paribus, trade 
liberalisation, which helps to reduce the trade cost, reduces the incentive for FDI. This 
is consistent with the well-known “tariff jumping” argument, which states that lower 
trade costs reduce the incentive for FDI.  
 
4.2. Privatisation and the host country welfare 
The purpose of this section is to find the optimal degree of privatisation for the host 
country. Since Proposition 1 suggests that a higher degree of privatisation increases 
the incentive for FDI, i.e.,  ) (α p f  is positively related to α , it is immediate that FDI 
  13) 0 ( p f f < will always occur irrespective of the degree of privatisation if   and FDI will 
never occur irrespective of the degree of privatisation if  . Therefore, 
depending on the fixed cost of FDI, we have the following three possibilities: (i) 
(F,F),
) 1 ( p f f >
9 i.e., firm M always undertakes FDI irrespective of the degree of privatisation, 
and it occurs for  , (ii) (X,X), i.e., firm M always exports irrespective of the 
degree of privatisation, and it occurs for  , and (iii) (X,F), i.e., privatisation 
may induce firm M to switch its mode of production from exporting to FDI, and it 
occurs for  . 
) 0 ( p f f <
) 1 ( p f f >
) 1 ( ) 0 ( p p f f f < <
Let us now determine the host country welfare. Given the degree of 
privatisation, the host country welfare is: 





2 2 2 1 2
α
α α α α
α
+
− − + + − − + + −
=
m p m p m p c c a c c a c c a
w ,             (10) 
where   if firm  x m c c = M 0 = m c M  exports and   if firm   undertakes FDI. 
 
4.2.1. Case when the foreign firm always undertakes FDI 
Now, we are in a position to determine the optimal degree of privatisation depending 
on the plant location strategy of firm M . First, let us consider the situation where the 
fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently small so that  ) 0 ( p f f < , i.e., we have the situation 
(F,F). In this situation, given the degree of privatisation, the host country welfare is:  










− + − − + −
=
p p p f
p
c a c a c a
w                (11) 
Differentiating   with respect to 
f
p w α , we obtain:  
                                                 
9 The first (second) letter in the bracket indicates the firm’s mode of entry before (after) privatisation 
takes place. 
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 is positively related to  . We also find that:  which suggests that  A p c
(i)  if   and  ,    0 = A 0 = p c 0 = α
(ii)  if    and  ,    0 < A 0 = p c 0 > α
2
a
cp = (iii)  if    and  ,    0 > A 0 = α
2
a
cp = (iv)  if    and  ,    0 < A 1 = α
(v)  At any given  ,   reduces with higher  p c A α . 
(vi)  At any given α , the relationship between  A and   is concave, and the 




p c . Hence, A shows a positive 







The information obtained above enables us to construct Figure 2 which illustrates the 
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Figure 2. The effect of privatisation on welfare when  
    the foreign firm always undertake FDI  
It is clear from Figure 2 that if   could be equal to  , any degree of privatisation 
would reduce the host country welfare if firm 
0 p c
M  always undertake FDI. However, 
for any   such that  p c
2
0 , there always exists a value of  a
c p < < ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α  such that 
, which implies that partial privatisation is always an optimal strategy for the 
host country government. For example, if c , the optimal degree of privatisation 
is  .  Further,  , which indicates the degree of privatisation that maximises the 
host country welfare for a given  , increases with higher  . It is also clear from 







α = α 1
p p
M  always undertakes 
FDI.  
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: Given that  p X f c c c ≤ < = 0  and assuming that the fixed cost of FDI is 
very small so that the foreign firm always undertakes FDI irrespective of the degree 
of privatisation, partial privatisation is the optimal strategy of the host country 




p ∈ c .  
  16The reason for the above finding can be explained as follows. Since a higher 
degree of privatisation reduces the weight on welfare maximisation and increases the 
weight on profit maximisation for the public firm, it tends to lower the consumer 
surplus by restricting the output of the public firm, thus creating a negative impact on 
the host country welfare. However, this output reduction by the public firm is being 
partially compensated by the higher output of the foreign firm, thus reducing the 
negative impact of lower output by the public firm. Moreover, the lower the marginal 
cost of the foreign firm compared to the public firm, the lower the effect of consumer 
surplus loss due to privatisation. There is also another effect of privatisation. A higher 
degree of privatisation increases the profit of the public firm, thus creating a positive 
impact on the host country welfare. 
If the public firm is (almost) completely nationalised, the significantly higher 
weight on welfare maximisation induces the public firm to produce a large amount of 
output. Hence, a slight amount of privatisation does not have significant negative 
effects on consumer surplus, while it helps to increase the profit of the public firm. 
Therefore, if the public firm is (almost) completely nationalised, the effect of higher 
profit generation due to privatisation dominates the loss of consumer surplus, for any 
cost difference between the public firm and the foreign firm, thus creating an 
incentive for privatisation.  
On the other hand, if the public firm is almost completely privatised, the 
output of the public firm is not very large, and a further reduction of the public firm’s 
output due to privatisation creates a significant negative impact on consumer surplus. 
Hence, in this situation, the loss of consumer surplus due to privatisation dominates 
the effect of higher profit in the public firm, thus reducing the incentive for 
  17privatisation. Therefore, for any cost difference between the public firm and the 
foreign firm, there exists a degree of privatisation that balances the positive effect of 
higher profit in the public firm and the negative effect of the loss of consumer surplus 
due to privatisation, and gives us the optimal degree of privatisation. Furthermore, as 
the cost efficiency of the foreign firm compared to the public firm increases, it 
reduces the loss of consumer surplus for a given degree of privatisation, thus 
increasing the incentive for higher degree of privatisation. Hence, as the cost 
difference between the foreign firm and the public firm increases, it increases the 
optimal degree of privatisation. 
 
4.2.2. Case when the foreign firm always exports 
Let us now consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is sufficiently high so 
that  , and firm M always exports irrespective of the degree of privatisation. 
In this situation, the host country welfare is:      
) 1 ( f f > p
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The following equation shows the relationship between the host country welfare and 
degree of privatisation.  
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which suggests that B and   are positively related. At any given  p c α , the relationship 





 Hence, B is positively sloped with respect to   over the interval  p c ]
2
, [ . We also 
find that the qualitative relationship between 
a
x c
B ,   and  c α p  is similar to the 
relationship between  A,   and  c α  shown in Figure 2. The relationship between  p B , 


















































































Figure 3: The effect of privatisation on welfare when  
  the foreign firm always exports    
Hence, we get the following proposition immediately from Figure 3. 
 
  19Proposition 3: Given that  p X f c c c ≤ < = 0  and the fixed cost of FDI is very high so 
that the foreign firm always exports irrespective of the degree of privatisation, 
complete nationalisation is the optimal strategy of the host country government if the 
public firm is equally efficient to the private firm (i.e., c ),  and partial 
privatisation is the optimal strategy of the host country government if the public firm 
is cost inefficient than the foreign firm (i.e., 
p x c =
2
c c p x < <
a
c
) 1 ( ) 0 ( f f f < <
). 
 The intuition for the above result is similar to that of Proposition 2. 
Since, in Figure 3, the higher difference between   and   implies the higher 
degree of privatisation, an implication of the above result is that, ceteris paribus, a fall 
in  , which may be the outcome of trade liberalisation, increases the host country 
government’s incentive for privatising its public firm as trade liberalisation increases 
the cost difference between the public firm and the foreign firm. Hence, trade 
liberalisation may increase the incentive for privatisation. 
p c x c
x
 
4.2.3. Privatisation attracting FDI 
Let us now consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is moderate so that 
. In this situation, the foreign firm exports without any degree of 
privatisation, whereas it may undertake FDI under a suitable degree of privatisation. 
Hence, privatisation can induce the foreign firm to switch its production strategy from 
exporting to FDI. However, it remains to see whether attracting FDI through a 
privatisation policy is worth for the host country. 
p p
  20From the expressions in equation (6), we find that, given the fixed cost of FDI, 
there exists a minimum α  (say,  1 f α ) such that the foreign firm is indifferent between 
FDI and exporting at this minimum α , and if α  is greater than this minimum α , the 
foreign firm finds it more profitable to undertake FDI than to export. Furthermore, as 
the fixed cost of FDI increases, the minimum α  that makes the foreign firm 
indifferent between undertaking FDI and exporting increases. We also find that, while 
for a given α ,   and  , the host country welfare is higher under FDI than under 
exporting by the foreign firm, the maximum welfare under exporting by the foreign 
firm is higher than the welfare “if the foreign firm undertakes FDI and there is 
complete privatisation”.  
c x c p
Depending on the fixed cost of FDI, which determines the minimum α  
required to attract FDI, the welfare analysis in this subsection can be summarised into 
three possible cases. Figure 4 shows the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is 
moderate but sufficiently small so that   is less than the value of  1 f α α  that maximises 
the host country welfare under FDI (say, 
*
f α ). Hence, in this situation, it is clear that 
the host country government prefers to privatise up to 
*
f α , since this helps to attract 
FDI and also maximises the host country welfare under FDI. So, the possibility of 
FDI under privatisation induces the host country government to increase the degree of 
privatisation compared to the situation with no possibility of FDI, where the optimal 
degree of privatisation is given by  , which is the degree of privatisation that 









Next, consider the situation where the fixed cost of FDI is such that 
*
1 f f α α >  
and the host country welfare under FDI at  1 f α  is greater than the maximum host 
country welfare under exporting (B>A). This is shown in Figure 5. In this situation, 






Lastly, consider the situation, where 
*
1 f f α α >  and the host country welfare 
under FDI at  1 f α  is lower than the maximum host country welfare under exporting 
(A>B in Figure 6). In this situation, the optimal degree of privatisation is  , which 
implies that, though there exists a degree of privatisation that can attract FDI, here it 
is not optimal for the host country to privatise in a way that actually attracts FDI. 
* α x
Figure 4: Privatisation attracting FDI, when   
*

























Figure 5: Privatisation attracting FDI, when 
*










f α 1 f α
 
α
Figure 6 Privatisation attracting FDI, when  1 f α  is very large 
In summary, the above analysis shows that whether privatisation that brings 
FDI improves the host country welfare is not clear and depends on the extent of 
privatisation required to attract FDI. It is possible that W(X,X) is higher than W(X,F) 
and the host government prefers firm M to export than to undertake FDI. Moreover, 
we also show that the host government will at least privatise its state-owned firm up 
to   and it will privatise beyond this point only if W(X,F) is higher than maximum 
W(X,X). In other words, the possibility of attracting FDI increases the incentive for 
privatisation.  
* α x
The above discussion is summarised in the following proposition. 
 Proposition 4: Whether privatisation that brings FDI improves the host country 
welfare depends on the extent to which privatisation is required to attract FDI. The 
possibility of attracting FDI increases the incentive for privatisation. However, if a 
high level of privatisation is needed to attract FDI, it may be possible that such 
privatisation for attracting FDI is not beneficial for the host country, and, in this 
situation, the host government privatises in a way that does not attract FDI an 
maximises the host country welfare under exporting by the foreign firm.  
  23 
4.3. The effects of cost reduction under privatisation  
It has been noted that one of the main aims of privatisation is to promote efficiency to 
the economy and to raise revenue for the state.
10 The high costs of production in the 
public firms compared to its private competitors may due to the limited provision on 
the firm’s R&D resources and/or managerial slackness. Privatisation may help to 
correct this inefficiency of the public firm. However, in the above analysis, to show 
the relationship between the effects of privatisation and FDI in the simplest way, we 
have abstracted away the possibility of public firm’s cost reduction due to 
privatisation.  
  Recently, Mukherjee and Sinha (2006) show that cost reduction in the 
domestic firm may reduce the foreign firm’s incentive for FDI by making the 
domestic industry more competitive. Hence, it suggests that if there is a cost reduction 
in the public firm, the net effect of privatisation on FDI depends on the relative 
strengths of higher private shareholdings, which tends to increase the market share of 
the foreign firm, and the cost reduction in the public firm, which tends to reduce the 
market share of the foreign firm. If the cost reduction in the public firm due to 
privatisation is significantly large, privatisation may reduce the incentive for FDI. In 
other words, Proposition 1 remains if the cost reduction effect due to privatisation is 
not very strong. 
  It should also be clear that a higher cost efficiency in the public firm due to 
privatisation would increase the incentive for privatisation if the degree of 
privatisation did not affect the mode of operation of the foreign firm. But, if the 
degree of privatisation affects the production strategy of the foreign firm, it is not so 
                                                 
10 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a recent survey on privatisation, profitability and efficiency of 
the firms. 
  24straightforward whether the cost efficiency in the public firm due to privatisation 
increases the host government’s incentive for privatisation. It would depend on the 
cost reduction in the public firm due to privatisation (which would also affect the 
incentive for FDI) and the cost change in the foreign firm due to its change of 
production strategy following privatisation. If the cost reduction in the public firm due 
to privatisation does not reduce the incentive for FDI, cost reduction in the public firm 
is likely to increase the incentive for privatisation. 
 
5. The effects of the incentive contracts  
Fershtman and Judd (1987) show that, in an oligopolistic industry with profit 
maximising firms, strategic separation of owners and managers, where owners design 
incentive schemes for managers who take production decisions, may make the owners 
better off compared to the situation where the owners take the production decisions.  
  In a closed economy, Barros (1995) extends this literature of incentive 
delegation to the case of mixed oligopoly, and concludes that complete nationalisation 
is the optimal strategy for the government.
 11  
  In this section, we extend our above analysis by introducing incentive 
delegation by the owners to the managers, and show that our qualitative results 
derived in the previous section hold. Hence, our results of the previous section are 
robust with respect to wider strategies of the firms. The analysis of this section also 
implies that the main conclusion of Barros (1995), i.e., no privatisation is the optimal 
strategy of the government, may not hold when the public firm faces competition 
mainly from a foreign private firm.  
                                                 
11 Barros (1995) provides detailed justifications of incentive schemes under mixed oligopoly 
framework.  
  25  We consider the following game in this section. At stage one, the host country 
government decides the degree of privatisation. At stage two, the public firm decides 
whether to undertake FDI or export.
12 At stage three, owners of the public and the 
foreign firms design the incentive contracts for their managers. At stage four, the 
managers choose the optimal outputs of the firms that maximise the incentive 
schemes given to them. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 
5.1. Privatisation and the incentive for FDI 
Under the incentive contracts regime, each owner offers his manager a contract that is 
a linear combination of profit and revenue, i.e.,  
( ) i i i i i R M λ π λ − + = 1 ,                                                                                     (17)   
where   is the incentive contract delegated by owner   to its manager, and  i M i i π  and 
 denote the profit and revenue of firm i respectively. Equation (17) expands to  i R
() ( ) i i i i i i q Q a q c Q a M ) ( 1 − − + − − = λ λ   .                        
i i i i q c q Q a λ − − = ) ( .                      (18)                    
Given  i λ , the Cournot reaction function for manager i is 
2





= ,                                                                                           (19)   
p m j i , , = j i ≠ where   and  . The equilibrium output of firm   is  i
3




λ λ − +
=                                                                   (20) 
 determined by owner i,  p m i , = Let us now determine the optimal values of  i λ . 
Similar to section 4, the objective functions of firms M P  (the foreign firm) and   (the 
                                                 
12 Since the purpose of this section is to show the implications of incentive delegation, we assume away 
any cost of hiring managers, and therefore, in equilibrium, both firms will hire managers and will 
delegate incentive schemes to them.   
  26public firm) are given by equations (1) and (2), respectively, and they maximise the 
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  Now we are ready to examine the effect of privatisation on the incentive for 
FDI. Firm   prefers to undertake FDI than export if and only if  M
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  27where    is difference of gross profits of firm M ) (α
ic
p f  under FDI and export. 





M  chooses to enter the market by undertaking FDI.  
  Like section 4, we find that the incentive for FDI is positively related to the 
higher degree of privatisation (see Appendix A), and this is noted in the following 
proposition. 
  
Proposition 5: Under the incentive contracts, a higher degree of privatisation 
increases the foreign firm’s incentive for FDI.  
 
5.2. Privatisation and the host country welfare 
Let us now consider the relationship between privatisation and the host country 
welfare under the incentive contracts. The expression below describes the host 
country welfare for a given degree of privatisation:  
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where  .  } , 0 { x m c c =
    
Proposition 7: Consider  p X f c c c ≤ < = 0 , and incentive delegations in both the public 
and the foreign firms. 
(i) If the foreign firm always undertakes FDI irrespective of the degree of 
privatisation (i.e.,  ), the optimal strategy of the host country government is 
to do partial privatisation for any cost difference between the firms.  
) 0 (
ic
p f f <
  28(ii) If the foreign firm always exports irrespective of the degree of privatisation (i.e., 
), the optimal strategy of the host country government is to undertake 
partial privatisation for any cost differences between the firms. However, if the public 
and the foreign firms share the same cost, full nationalisation is the optimal policy.  
) 1 (
ic f f > p
(iii) If  , FDI does not occur under complete nationalisation while it 
may occur under privatisation. In this situation, partial privatisation is the optimal 
strategy of the host country government, though it is ambiguous whether the host 
country will privatise up to the point that induces the foreign firm to undertake FDI. If 
sufficiently high degree of privatisation is required to attract FDI, such privatisation 
may not be profitable and the host country government privatises up to the point that 
does not attract FDI and provides maximum possible host country welfare under 
exporting. Otherwise, the host country government privatises up to the point that 
provides maximum possible host country welfare conditional on FDI by the foreign 
firm. 




p f f f > >
 
Since the proofs of the above results are similar to the results shown in section 
4, we show the formal calculations for Propositions 7(i) and 7(ii) in Appendix B. The 
proof of Proposition 7(iii) is similar to the analysis of subsection 4.2.3, and we skip 
this analysis here to avoid repetition. 
  It is worth mentioning that our results suggest that the main conclusion of 
Barros (1995), which says that in presence of the incentive contracts the government 
should not privatise the public firm, might not hold in an open economy with foreign 
competition. We are aware that the framework of the present paper and that of Barros 
(1995) are different. Our analysis suggests that the conclusion of Barros (1995) is 
  29very much dependent on the economic scenario. Therefore, a consideration of policy 
prescriptions from Barros (1995) must be interpreted with caution.  
 
5.3. Comparing the outcomes under the incentive contracts and the no incentive 
contract  
Let us now compare the effects of privatisation on the incentive for FDI and the host 




cp < , which always ensures duopoly market structure under both 
incentive contracts and the no incentive contract. 
The comparison of   and   leads to the following proposition.  ) (α
ic
p f ) (α p f
 
Proposition 8: Given that the duopoly market structure always exists under both 
incentive contracts and the no incentive contract, at any given  , the FDI incentive 
is higher under the incentive contracts than under the no incentive contract.  
α
 
  The incentive contracts regime helps the foreign firm to gain higher market 
share compared to the situation with the no incentive scheme. However, this benefit 
from higher output is higher under FDI since it helps to reduce the distortion from a 
higher cost associated with exporting. Therefore, the firm has higher incentive to 
undertake FDI under the incentive contracts regime than under the no incentive 
contract.  
  Looking at the welfare analysis under the incentive scheme and the no 
incentive regime, we find that, although both the regimes provide the same qualitative 
conclusions, for a given α , the host country welfare is higher under the incentive 
  30contracts than under the no incentive contract. Hence, the degree of partial 
privatisation that maximises the host country welfare may differ between these two 
regimes.  
 
Proposition 9: Given that the duopoly market structure always exists under both the 
incentive contracts and the no incentive contract, at any given  , the optimal degree 
of privatisation is higher under the incentive contracts than under the no incentive 




See Appendix C for the proof. 
  The effect of incentive contracts on the degree of privatisation in comparison 
to the situation of no incentive contract is not so straightforward. Given that the 
duopoly market structure always exists under both the incentive contracts and the no 
incentive contract, Proposition 8 shows that the incentive for FDI is higher under the 
incentive contracts than under the no incentive contract. This clearly implies that, in 
this situation, the degree of privatisation that attracts FDI under the no incentive 
contract also attracts FDI under the incentive contracts. If the situation under the no 
incentive contract is W(X,F) and the optimal degree of privatisation is the degree of 
privatisation that maximises the host country welfare corresponding to either FDI or 
exporting by the foreign firm (i.e., corresponding to 
*
f α  and 
*
x α  in Figures 4 and 6, 
respectively), it is clear that the degree of privatisation under the incentive contracts is 
higher than under the no incentive contract. This is because, irrespective of whether 
the foreign firm undertakes FDI or export, the maximum welfare under the incentive 
contracts are always higher than under the no incentive contract.  
  31  However, if the situation under the no incentive contract is such that the 
optimal degree of privatisation is beyond the degree of privatisation that maximises 
the host country welfare under FDI by the foreign firm, i.e., similar to Figure 5 where 
>
*
f α 1 f α , the optimal degree of privatisation under the incentive contracts may be 
lower than under the no incentive contract ( < 1, f IC α 1 f α ). This possibility is shown in 
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  Figure 7:  Comparison of the optimal degree of privatisation under  
   the incentive contracts and no incentive contract 
   
  Since, under the incentive contracts, the government needs a lower amount of 
privatisation than  1 f α  to attract FDI, the optimal degree of privatisation under the 
incentive contracts regime may be up to  1, f IC α  and the corresponding host country 
welfare equals to A.
13 Hence, in this situation, the optimal degree of privatisation 
under the incentive contracts is lower than that of under the no incentive contract. It is 
important to note that our argument for privatising up to A under the incentive 
contracts assumes that, under the incentive contracts, the host country welfare at A is 
greater than the host country welfare under exporting by the foreign firm. Under the 
incentive contracts, if the host country welfare under exporting by the foreign firm is 
greater than the host country welfare at A, the degree of privatisation under the 
                                                 
13 We do not draw  ( ) ,
IC WX X  in Figure 7 to keep it simple.  
  32incentive contracts will be lower than A, thus strengthening our argument for lower 
degree of privatisation under the incentive contracts than under the no incentive 
contract.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Though privatisation and the inflow of FDI are two important developments in many 
developing and transitional economies, the existing theoretical literature has failed to 
capture both these aspects together. We take up this issue in this paper, and show the 
interaction between privatisation and FDI. 
  We show that privatisation increases the incentive for FDI. However, whether 
a country would prefer to privatise up to a point that attracts FDI is ambiguous. If the 
degree of privatisation that is required to attract FDI is sufficiently high, the host 
country may not find it beneficial to attract FDI through privatisation. Instead, it will 
privatise up to the point at which the host country welfare is maximised under export 
by the foreign firm. We show that whether or not the degree of privatisation affects 
the mode of production of the foreign firm, partial privatisation is the optimal strategy 
of the host country. The cost difference between the domestic public firm and the 
foreign private firm is also important to determine the degree of privatisation. So, the 
cost difference between the firms as well as the effect of privatisation on the foreign 
firm’s production strategy, both play important roles in determining the privatisation 
policy. Our main conclusions are robust with respect to the incentive delegation 
within firms.  
  There is, however, an important remark that needs to be made. So far, we have 
focused on the effect of privatisation on the foreign firm’s production strategy but 
abstracted our analysis from entry of the host country firms. Privatisation may attract 
  33new entry of the host country firms by reducing the output of the public firm, thus 
leaving more residual market to the potential domestic firms. Higher competition in 
the host country market due to the domestic firms’ entry reduces the residual demand 
for the foreign firm and may adversely affect the foreign firm’s incentive to undertake 
FDI. Hence, the effects of entry of the domestic firms on the incentive to undertake 
FDI due to privatisation and the corresponding welfare implications will be similar to 
the effects of cost reduction in the public firm, which has been discussed in subsection 
4.3. 
  Another extension of the present paper is to consider foreign acquisition of the 
public firm can also be another area for further research. Acquiring the public firm by 
the foreign firm can be viewed as the firm’s strategy to eliminate competition in the 
domestic market. Since the market becomes more attractive for investment after 
privatisation, the foreign firm may have higher incentive for FDI compared to the 
situation where an acquisition by the foreign firm is prohibited in a privatisation 
policy. We intend to take up this and the related issues in our future research. 
  34Appendix  
A. The incentive for FDI  
If   increases when  increases, the incentive for FDI increases with 
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The derivative suggests that C  is negatively related to  , irrespective of  . 




cp = , which is the maximum   that always 
ensures duopoly market structure under the incentive contracts regime. This means 








p c  and it is 




B. The calculations for Propositions 7(i) and 7(ii) 
7(i) The following expression describes welfare of the host country when firm M 
always conduct FDI irrespective of privatisation.  
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We also find that:  
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. The derivation shows that at any value of  and  α , the relationship between D 
and   is concave. However, the value of   that maximises D is greater than 
3
a
p c p c , 
suggesting that D is positively sloped for 
3
0 . We also find that at  , D <0 
for any degree of privatisation. Furthermore, for 
a
cp < < 0 = p c
3
0 ,  D >0 if and only if 
; D <0, otherwise. The following figure illustrates how D changes with c . 
The optimal degree of privatisation for a given cost of the public firm is now clear 




















































































































  Figure B.1: The effect of privatisation on welfare with FDI   
under the incentive contracts 
 
 
  367(ii) The following expression describes welfare of the host country when firm M 
always undertakes FDI irrespective of the degree of privatisation. We find that:  
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Equation (B.6) is greater than zero. In addition, we get that  . 
However, the value of   which maximises E is greater than  p c
3
a
, suggesting that E 









. Figure B.2 shows the relationship between E 
and  , and the optimal degree of privatisation for a given cost of the public firm is 



























































































































































Figure B.2: The effect of privatisation on welfare export  
under the incentive contracts 
   
 
C. Comparing the optimal degree of privatisation under incentive scheme and 
the no incentive scheme 
3
a
cp < Let us consider that  , which always ensures duopoly market structure both 
under incentive scheme and the no incentive scheme. Now, consider the situation of 





















 under the no incentive scheme and under the incentive scheme 
respectively. The comparison of these values shows that 
**
, f IC f α α > . 

























 and   under the no incentive scheme and under 
the incentive scheme respectively. Hence, 
**
, xI C x α α > . 
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